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TALKING ABOUT SEA CONTROL
Robert C. Rubel
The year 1990 was a significant one in naval history. It marked the transitionfrom a world in which the oceans were contested to one in which one navy
had uncontested command of the sea. The evidence for this shift is that during
the run-up to the first Gulf War with Iraq, the U.S. Navy positioned half of its to-
tal aircraft carrier striking power in narrow seas, splitting it between the Red Sea
and the Persian Gulf. If there was any conceivable threat, such a move would
have constituted strategic Russian roulette. The incipient demise of the Soviet
Union and the evaporation of its fleet, along with Iran’s decision to stand aside,
made the only threat to U.S. ships the stub oil platforms in the Persian Gulf and
some mines in the gulf ’s northern reaches.
In the two decades since, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed
total command of the sea, so much so that it has
stopped talking about sea control, even to the extent
of forgetting how to. With the emergence in China of a
robust area-denial force of great range and a navy ca-
pable of reaching beyond home waters, the time has
again come to talk about sea control. This article will
try to support the dialogue by discussing naval opera-
tional concepts that navies have used in the past and
relating them to today’s environment.
NAVAL OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
The first thing to understand about naval warfare is
that it almost never occurs between two evenly
matched navies or fleets. There is always some
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imbalance, and it is the degree and nature of the imbalance that spawn the naval
operational concepts admirals employ to squeeze the most strategic value out of
their fleets. Thus the following discussion will be organized against a presump-
tion of imbalance, starting with the concepts used by a fleet with great superior-
ity and ending with those used by the weaker side. Also, it should be noted at the
outset that it is hard to separate naval operations from merchant shipping; naval
operational concepts frequently involve acting against another’s sea commerce.
This point will be blended in rather seamlessly in the concepts discussed below.
A third factor underlying this examination is sanctuary. Because naval warfare is
characterized by the dominance of the tactical offense (he who shoots effectively
first generally wins—a principle articulated by Wayne Hughes), sanctuary is
needed to prevent the enemy from getting off a first shot or engaging in the first
place. In an age of aircraft, missiles, and nuclear bombs, sanctuary is harder than
ever to achieve.1
Blockade. A fleet that has great superiority may choose simply to bottle up an
opponent’s fleet and his commerce by stationing forces off his ports. The goal
may be economic strangulation, or it may be simply to keep his fleet from get-
ting to sea. This worked well in ages before aviation, when ships could operate
out of shore artillery range (i.e., the enemy’s sanctuary). Aircraft greatly compli-
cate the problem, missiles and submarines even more. At some point a distant
blockade becomes ineffective in a military sense and turns into commerce raid-
ing, in an economic framework. Moreover, in an age where merchant ships have
flags of convenience, multinational crews, international ownership, and cargoes
that may change hands several times during a voyage, economic blockade be-
comes problematic.
From the Sea. A fleet that enjoys command of the sea (that is, establishes condi-
tions in which the other navy cannot come out and challenge), or at least local
sea control, but does not have the possibility of land-based aviation support can
nonetheless bring with it everything it needs to project power ashore. In current
terms, this is sea basing. The Leyte Gulf operation in World War II is an example.
Given today’s long-range aircraft, it is doubtful that there will be any more pure
“from the sea” operations, although the initial operations in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM approximated such an undertaking, with the important
exceptions that land-based tankers and reconnaissance aircraft were available.
The British operations in the Falklands in 1982 also came close. Smaller-scale
sea-basing operations might be mounted purely from the sea, and the modern
expeditionary strike group is well designed for such a concept.
Air-Sea Battle. The stronger fleet, whether or not it encounters opposition, may
be supported by land-based aircraft to a significant extent. General Douglas
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MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign in World War II constituted a good ex-
ample; his operational jumps reached only as far as the operational radius arcs of
his land-based fighters. Today it is hard to imagine any major naval operation that
would not represent some form of this concept.2 Of course, we can blend space
and cyberspace into this concept too—and surely will. The defensive converse of
this concept would be the operation of an area-denial force, like that which the
Chinese are building, in the littoral. The idea would be, using a combination of
ballistic missiles and shore-based aircraft in conjunction with submarines and
surface ships, to present the U.S. or other navy with a multidimensional threat
that would be too hard to deal with. In both the offensive and defensive versions,
the coordination of land-based and sea-based forces is critical, but that is some-
thing that has not often been satisfactorily achieved.
Decisive Naval Battle. In a contest for control of the oceans between two capable
navies, a decisive battle has been the goal of the stronger. This is what Nelson
sought in 1805 as he chased the combined Franco-Spanish squadron, and it is
what Yamamoto sought in 1942 at Midway. Generally speaking, the weaker force
will attempt to avoid such an engagement, but every once in a while circum-
stances conspire to precipitate one. Trafalgar was produced by Napoleon’s order-
ing Admiral Villeneuve to sortie, and Midway was produced by Chester Nimitz’s
recognition that an ambush was possible. There might have been one off the
Falklands in 1982, had there been sufficient wind for the Argentine carrier to
launch its strike aircraft and had the aircraft then inflicted damage on the British
carriers. In today’s world there is little or no chance of such an engagement, ex-
cept possibly among two smaller navies.
Fleet-in-Being. A navy that is strong but reluctant to roll the dice on a decisive
battle might elect to avoid engagement but still present a threat to the stronger
navy that would keep it from doing what it wanted (like projecting power
ashore). In 1690 Lord Torrington, commanding the Anglo-Dutch fleet, adopted
such a concept by keeping his fleet upwind of the French. Although suffering a
defeat at the battle of Beachy Head, he kept his fleet intact, such that it consti-
tuted a threat to any invasion operation (which would compromise the mobility
of the French force) but could not be brought to battle. Thus it achieved its stra-
tegic goal of preventing an invasion. The key to making a fleet-in-being strategy
work is sanctuary. Today sanctuary is hard to find. However, diesel submarines
might constitute a fleet-in-being if they went to sea and “got lost.” If they could
avoid detection they might constitute a sufficient threat, at least for a while, to
keep the stronger navy (presumably American) from projecting power as it
wished. A lone Argentine Type 209 submarine almost did this in the Falklands;
the British task force used up almost all its antisubmarine weapons on false
4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Autumn2010-Rubel.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Autumn2010\NWCR_Autumn2010.vp
Thursday, August 19, 2010 1:24:31 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
3
Rubel: Talking about Sea Control
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
contacts. Other sources of sanctuary might be political alignments or dense um-
brellas of missiles and aircraft.
Commerce Raiding. A navy that is not strong enough even to constitute a fleet-
in-being might try commerce raiding (also known by the French term guerre de
course). The Germans resorted to it in both world wars. This concept requires
sustained and systematic operations and therefore sanctuary for the bases of the
raiders (since the early twentieth century, usually submarines). In an age of jet
bombers and missiles, achieving such sanctuary is hard to imagine today, except
perhaps for the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the same factors that complicate blockade
make commerce raiding almost infeasible in the current environment. In any
case, if the U.S. Navy attempted to interdict Chinese commerce, nuclear escala-
tion could become an issue.
Delay, Disruption, Denial, and Demoralization. If a navy is not strong enough
for anything else, it can attempt “delay, disruption, denial, and demoralization”
(D4) operations. That is, it can send out units to try to do enough damage to the
stronger force (which is presumably attempting to project power or blockade) to
cause that force to abandon the operation or at least delay it, giving the weaker
power some strategic breathing space. The effects of the “hits” may be physical,
such that the operation cannot continue, or they may be demoralizing, either to
the force itself or the attacking nation’s public or leadership. The Argentine
strategy after its fleet retreated to port was of this nature, and it almost worked
when the containership Atlantic Conveyor was sunk by an Exocet. The Japanese
SHO plan in World War II was also a D4 strategy. One of the elements that make a
D4 strategy dangerous and potentially effective is the resolute acceptance by its
implementer of the prospect that what it sends out will not come back. A D4
strategy is normally not sustainable unless—and this is a big unless—the weaker
side has some kind of sanctuary that enables it to hide its forces until they are
used and thereby meter them out over time. Mines and coastal submarines are
potentially effective D4 tools. Such operations that are maintained for a substan-
tial length of time essentially constitute “irregular warfare” at sea.
Maritime Security. Though not universally recognized today as a true area of na-
val warfare, maritime security has nonetheless been raised to a naval strategic
imperative by the possibility that terrorists might sneak nuclear or other weap-
ons into the United States or a friendly nation by sea. Given the economic and
political disruptions caused by the 9/11 attacks, a seaborne insertion of weapons
of mass destruction could be regarded as having the strategic importance of a
conventional invasion. Maritime security thus occupies the same level of impor-
tance for the U.S. Navy as did fleet-based defense of the hemisphere in Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s time. Maritime security in today’s world requires an almost
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seamless blanket of awareness and cooperation over all the world’s oceans. Thus
it is inherently an international naval mission; the U.S. Navy’s job is to help cata-
lyze this cooperation. In fact, as an operational concept, maritime security today
is different from the others in that it is absolutely dependent on the integrated
operations of both strong and weak navies.
Bastions and Maneuver. If the principle of dominance of the offense at the tacti-
cal level holds true, which it has for the majority of naval history, logic says that
trying to establish strongpoints or bastions at sea is a losing proposition. Two ex-
ceptions—where the defensive at sea has worked—have, by their rarity, the ef-
fect of proving the rule. The first is the clash between USS Monitor and CSS
Virginia in March 1862, during the American Civil War. These ships being the
first ironclads, naval guns and shells that could pierce armor did not yet exist,
and thus the cannonballs of each bounced off the other. Less than a century later,
the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 was a triumph of integrated air de-
fense due to the slowness of Japanese bombers and to the American use of radar
to direct fighters, as well as of VT (proximity, or “variable time”) fuses on anti-
aircraft shells. Today, although U.S. cruisers and destroyers carry the incompara-
ble Aegis weapons system, modern antiship missiles have capabilities and
characteristics that make them very hard to detect and shoot down. Submarines
and mines are still very difficult to find. Naval leaders must still consider very
carefully the fact that if “the other guy” knows where to find you, he can likely
find a way either to evade or saturate any defensive scheme. If nothing else, he
may just get lucky. Therefore, when there is a sea-control threat, maneuver is a
requirement until that threat is neutralized.
That point raises the issue of the modern “sea base,” essentially a stationary
strongpoint at sea. In some U.S. Navy publications, the definition of the term is
stretched to include almost any grouping of ships at sea, regardless of how they
are arranged or maneuvered. Such definitions have more relevance to inter-
service budget competition than actual utility in naval operational art. A sea
base is intrinsically a group of ships supporting an operation ashore. Accord-
ingly, its scope of operational maneuver is highly restricted, as is the degree of
tactical maneuver that can be tolerated if support to the shore is to remain effec-
tive. But history has taught navies not to get themselves into situations in which
they must risk a disaster ashore in order to avert one at sea, or vice versa. This was
Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher’s dilemma right after the Guadalcanal landings in
1942: he felt constrained to remove his “sea base” of aircraft carriers before it
could be attacked by the Japanese, since his carriers were the only operational
ones in the Pacific. Thus, in theory, a navy should not attempt to project power
ashore until it has achieved sea control. But the theory almost never holds. A
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smart opponent will wait until the attacker is lodged ashore and cannot maneu-
ver without invoking the dilemma above. This was the Japanese plan at
Guadalcanal (from which resulted the first battle of Savo Island, disastrous for
the Americans), Saipan (and the battle of the Philippine Sea), and Leyte (the
SHO plan). The same dynamic was illustrated with the Argentine D4 operations
during the British landings at the Falklands. Attempting to create and defend
bastions at sea entails risk.
AIRCRAFT CARRIER DOCTRINAL ROLES
If there were no sea-control threat, there would be no need to discuss the doc-
trinal roles of carriers. As a new and uncertain modern world emerges, it is time
to review how aircraft carriers have been used during their history. They are
high-value units, and accordingly their use has always been governed by the de-
gree of risk it is appropriate to incur; the doctrinal roles for carriers are centered
on this aspect of their operations.
Eyes of the Fleet. The original use envisioned (at least by battleship admirals) for
carriers was behind the battle line, out of harm’s way, sending aircraft to scout
and spot for the battle line. Interestingly, this may be a future role for our carri-
ers. They stay far out at sea, beyond the range of missile-based access-denial sys-
tems, and send in ultra-long-range unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication relay in support of a grid of
submarines, destroyers, and other craft “inside the arena.”
Cavalry. In early 1942, aircraft carriers supported the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, as
well as a number of hit-and-run raids meant to disrupt Japanese operations. In
these, the carriers relied on the protective cover of a large ocean. The missions
were such that the carriers, if detected, could immediately run for safety; stand-
ing and fighting would have been suicidal. So long as a carrier can remain
unlocated, it can speed around and deliver quick pulses of aerial bombardment.
Capital Ship. When in World War II a decisive naval battle became possible, as at
Midway, carriers would stand and fight. Nimitz’s definition of calculated risk
nicely captures the logic of committing capital ships to a desperate fight: “You
will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to
mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces
without good prospect of inflicting . . . greater damage on the enemy.” Any capi-
tal ship is a “consumable” in such a fight, but not cannon fodder. Thus, when
there was a prospect of inflicting greater damage to the other fleet, carriers could
be risked, and of course some were lost. By the way, a capital ship is that ship type
that is most capable in a fight for sea control and around which the tactics of the
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fleet are centered. “Capital ship” is thus a doctrinal term related to sea control,
not a general phrase describing any big, expensive naval ship.
Nuclear Strike Platform. After World War II, in the “Revolt of the Admirals” era,
the Navy pressed its carriers into service as nuclear strike platforms. This was
due not only to interservice fights with the Air Force but also to genuine concern
that the slow B-36 bombers might not get through. The carriers had to survive to
get to their launch positions; after that, all bets were off. Carriers retained their
nuclear missions until the 1980s, when the evolving global situation made the
massive Single Integrated Operational Plan obsolete.
Air Base at Sea.When carriers provide continuous support to operations ashore,
they are functioning as air bases at sea—that is, as a kind of sea base. As such,
they are constrained in their maneuvering and thus cannot tolerate any risk
from sea-control threats. This is the mode in which aircraft carriers have been
operating for virtually the whole post–Cold War era. Trying to use them in this
mode in a sea-control situation almost guarantees they will take hits. During the
Falklands War, the British had to use their carriers as sea bases, but because there
was a sea-control threat from the Argentines, the carriers had to be kept out of
harm’s way. This meant that their short-legged Harrier jets could not provide
adequate air defense for the San Carlos beachhead, and a number of destroyers
and frigates were lost as a result. When carriers try to function as air bases inside
the range arcs of sea-control threats, they must try to erect bastions around
themselves. As previously discussed, this is a debatable proposition.
WATER COLORS
Reference is heard in naval circles to three metaphorical “colors” of water: blue,
green, and brown. They denote generally the proximity of land: “blue” water, the
oceanic, reaches farthest from land; “green” water is the oceanic littoral; and
“brown” water comprises rivers, bays, and estuaries. In the Cold War, these col-
ors had more specific meanings. Blue water meant those areas of the ocean in
which only other naval forces could confront one’s own. Green water denoted
those areas of the ocean in which naval forces could be confronted and affected
by land-based aircraft. Brown water was that zone of the ocean that could be
covered by ground-based artillery. This distinction had some vague planning
value, but the advent of long-range jet bombers carrying antiship cruise missiles
made virtually all of the oceans “green.” In the era of total U.S. Navy dominance
after the Cold War, the “colors” of water all but disappeared, other than in char-
acterizations of a navy as “blue water,” which meant oceangoing, capable of
more than purely littoral operations. With the emergence of very capable
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sea-denial forces and oceangoing navies that might turn out to be adversaries,
there is utility to readopting this shorthand, but with new definitions. The new
basis of definitions would be the kind of naval forces that can operate at an ac-
ceptable degree of risk in water of each color.
Blue water would denote those areas of the ocean in which naval forces struc-
tured around high-value units (usually aircraft carriers or large amphibious
ships, but perhaps in the future such things as arsenal ships as well) can operate.
High-value units (HVUs) concentrate a substantial proportion of the force’s of-
fensive combat power in a single ship, the loss of which would likely unhinge a
whole operation or at least significantly reduce the odds of its success. These
ships are normally surrounded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers, as well as
perhaps submarines operating in more distant support; the idea is to create a de-
fensive bastion around the HVU that can fend off attacks by submarines, air-
craft, other surface ships, and missiles. An HVU-centered naval formation relies
on not only defensive firepower and electronic countermeasures but also ma-
neuver to defeat attacks. Such maneuver seeks to deny detection and targeting as
well as to force enemy units, especially submarines, to engage in such disadvan-
tageous actions as speeding up in order to attack. If an HVU and its escort are far
enough out at sea, the odds will be in their favor: they have plenty of room for
maneuver, and an opponent can muster fewer forces against them. Blue water
comprises those areas of the ocean where both of these conditions obtain. The
weaker the opponent, the closer to shore blue water exists.
If an opposing nation possesses powerful antiaccess forces, especially if they
consist of capable submarines, aircraft, surface vessels, and missiles, there comes
a point at which the ability of the screen protecting an HVU risks being satu-
rated. Depending on the sophistication of the antiaccess force—in terms of ad-
vanced missiles that are hard to shoot down, numerous tactical aircraft, robust
sea surveillance and targeting, etc.—the distance at which saturation could oc-
cur varies. A small boat–based force can reach out only a few miles; one possess-
ing antiship ballistic missiles can reach out hundreds. As an HVU-centered force
moves inside the range arcs of various antiaccess systems, the defense problem
becomes more difficult. Instead of just submarines and long-range bombers, the
screen now has to deal with surface vessels (like fast missile boats), land-based
tactical aircraft, and shore-launched missiles. Threats become not only more di-
verse but also more numerous. As the force moves in, the likelihood of “leakers”
(missiles, aircraft, submarines, etc., that survive screen defenses to get a shot at
the high-value unit itself) increases. Depending on the strategic and operational
situation, there is a point at which the risk to the HVU becomes incommensu-
rate with the nature and value of its mission. It is at that point that blue water
would turn green.
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Green water, in the new scheme, would embrace those areas of the ocean into
which it is not rational to send HVUs. In green water, a different approach to na-
val warfare would have to be taken; offensive power must be dispersed into a
number of vessels that have sufficient stealth and other characteristics that make
them capable of operating in these areas, where antiaccess systems are capable of
“ganging up” on high-value units. At first glance, this may seem to mean only
submarines could enter green water, but certain kinds of surface combatants
might be usable as well. What seems clear is that the offensive weapons of neces-
sity in these waters would be missiles, torpedoes, and mines (be they launched
from manned or unmanned vessels). The “names of the game” in green water
would be hiding, deception, countertargeting, and ambush—and also, con-
versely, reconnaissance, targeting, and communicating. Given the lethality of
modern antiship missiles, torpedoes, and mines, naval forces entering green wa-
ters would be at significant risk, whether attacking or defending. As space, mis-
sile, and other technologies improve, the proportion of green water in the world
will expand.
Brown water, in the new order of things, would not simply be “worse green
water” but zones in which oceangoing units could not operate effectively at all.
Generally speaking, this would mean waters that are too shallow, narrow, or in-
fested with mines. In brown water, only smaller craft could operate effectively,
whether or not there was any actual opposition. While brown water clearly de-
notes rivers and some bays, it would not necessarily be limited to them. Depend-
ing on opposition and other conditions, certain seaward littoral areas, as well as
straits and other choke points, might be regarded as brown water.
These new definitions, if they became widely accepted, would represent a use-
ful shorthand for planning and discussing sea control. The very fact of acknowl-
edging that green water, as just defined, even exists would lead necessarily to
force-structure decisions that would in turn produce a naval force that is at least
a bit less centered on high-value units than at present. Moreover, determining
where potential naval missions exist in brown water might yield a force that was
not simply “riverine” in nature. Using these water colors, with the proposed def-
initions, could enhance dialogue on sea control and point to a force more use-
fully adapted to the emerging strategic and operational environment.
THE DISCIPLINE OF SEA CONTROL
When a navy’s sea control is challenged, life is more difficult. That navy cannot
assume free access to the littorals, and it may face the prospect of being attacked
far out at sea, depending on the particulars of a dispute. Since the best protection
for a naval force is to be unlocated in the vast ocean, the force must not only de-
velop measures for achieving this condition in wartime but must set things up
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accordingly in advance, in peacetime. Thus a navy that contemplates opposition
must attain an operational discipline that includes not only tactics and weapons
but also command-and-control doctrine and nodes, as well as integration with
diplomatic circles. The U.S. Navy allowed this discipline to erode in the Vietnam
era, when it focused all its energies on power projection. Consequently, when a
true sea-control challenge arose, in the form of the Soviet Fifth Eskadra during
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the U.S. Navy had neither the weapons nor the tac-
tics to deal with the situation.3 Only after the crisis (mercifully) blew over did the
Navy take up rediscovering sea control. Since 1990, however, the Navy has again
focused on power projection and, again, has lost the discipline of sea control.
Perhaps this article will stimulate a new rebirth of this discipline before the Navy
is confronted with a new challenge for which it is unprepared.
NOTE S
1. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1986), p. 25.
2. For a theoretical, doctrinal, and historical ex-
amination of the nature, planning, and con-
duct of major naval operations generally, see
Milan Vego, Major Naval Operations, New-
port Paper 32 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, September 2008), available at
www.usnwc.edu/press/.
3. For this episode see Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri
M. Zhukov, “A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian
Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the
Mediterranean,” Naval War College Review
57, no. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 27–63, available
at www.usnwc.edu/press/.
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